UNNECESSARY INDETERMINACY: PROCESS
PATENT PROTECTION AFTER KINIK V. ITC
JOHN M. EDEN 1

ABSTRACT
In Kinik v. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that the
defenses available to foreign manufacturers in infringement
actions under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) in Federal district courts do
not apply to exclusion actions before the International Trade
Commission. This iBrief argues that this decision is problematic
for three reasons: (1) the Federal Circuit’s decision is
inconsistent with the ITC’s longstanding tradition of consulting
the patent statute when adjudicating exclusion actions under 19
U.S.C. § 1337, (2) the court’s suggestion that the ITC should be
given broad discretion to resolve conflicts between the patent
statute and the Tariff Act is at odds with the Chevron doctrine,
and (3) if the ITC employs the broad discretion that Kinik
confers to it by excluding more foreign art than Federal district
courts could lawfully exclude under the patent statute, the
enforcement of domestic patent policy in the United States could
conceivably violate obligations of non-discrimination (Article
27.1) and burden-shifting (Article 34) imposed by the TRIPS
Agreement.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
United States patent holders seeking to prevent foreign
manufacturers from infringing their process patents have traditionally
enjoyed two forms of legal redress. Under existing patent law a patent
holder can sue in Federal district court to prevent the importation of
goods produced by patented processes, provided that such goods are not
“materially changed by subsequent processes” or have not become “a
trivial and nonessential component of another product.” 2 If these two
1

LLM/J.D. 2006, Duke University School of Law; M.A. 2000, Stanford
University; B.A. 1997, Loyola University Chicago. This article has benefitted
from the helpful guidance and incisive criticism of Professor Mark Lemley of
Stanford Law School. All remaining errors and misstatements are the author’s
alone.
2
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 9

tests are met, patent holders can obtain monetary damages which reflect
the economic losses that they have sustained. Alternatively, under the
amended Tariff Act of 1930 a patent holder can initiate an exclusion
action before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), which if
successful, results in a ban on imported products produced through
infringing processes. 3
¶2
The effectiveness of these two complementary forms of
enforcement depends upon ensuring that the same infringement standards
apply in both federal court actions and exclusion actions before the ITC.
The 1988 Process Patents Amendment Act (“Act”) provides that sharedstandard: If a foreign product producer sells or uses within the territories
of the United States a product made by a process patented therein, as
long as the sale or use is commercial, that foreign producer is guilty of
wrongful infringement. Unfortunately, this shared standard is threatened
by Kinik v. ITC, 4 a recent case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that § 271(g) defenses only apply in
federal court. Thus, in exclusion actions, the ITC may be emboldened in
the future to use its own unrestrained discretion to determine whether a
foreign product should be excluded.

This has serious implications for international patent regulation.
While federal courts have an obligation to strike a balance between the
interests of U.S. patent holders against the need to allow foreign
manufacturers to innovate, the ITC can capriciously disturb this careful
balance by excluding the importation of foreign products that do not run
afoul of current patent law. To make matters worse, the Kinik dicta also
undermine the preclusive effect that federal court rulings are traditionally
given in subsequent ITC proceedings.
¶3

I. BREAKING WITH TRADITION
¶4
The facts of Kinik are relatively simple. The Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co. and Ultimate Abrasive Systems LLC (hereinafter
“3M”) brought an exclusion action before the ITC to prevent the Kinik
Company from importing abrasive products from Taiwan. 3M’s theory
was that the abrasive products Kinik was importing were being
manufactured with the aid of one of its patented processes, namely U.S.
Patent No. 5,620,489 (“‘489 patent”). 5 In the exclusion proceeding, the
ITC agreed with 3M, finding that that process claimed in the ‘489 patent
was being used in Taiwan to manufacture abrasive products later

3
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imported by the Kinik Company into the United States. 6 The Federal
Circuit, however, held that the ‘489 patent was not actually infringed by
the manufacturing processes utilized in Taiwan. 7 The Federal Circuit
thus reversed the ITC’s judgment of infringement. 8
The holding in Kinik is not really surprising. But the same
cannot be said of its dicta, which possess startling implications for
process patent protection in the United States. When this case was
before the ITC, in addition to arguing that the imported goods at issue
were not manufactured with the unauthorized assistance of a patented
process, the Kinik Company also offered a clever fall-back position.
According to this argument, its products did not infringe the ‘489 patent
because under § 271(g) they had been materially changed by subsequent
processes. 9

¶5

The ITC was unsympathetic to this contention, and held that the
defenses to infringement provided under § 271(g) are not available in
exclusion actions before the ITC. Citing ambiguous language from the
legislative history of the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 10
(“Act”), the ITC concluded that the defenses provided in § 271(g) are
inapplicable to cases brought before the ITC because Congress intended
to prevent courts from extending these defenses to exclusion actions.
The relevant language relied upon by the ITC states that “the
amendments made by this subtitle shall not deprive a patent owner of any
remedies available . . . under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or
under any other provision of law.” 11 Noting that such a clause would not
have been included “unless it served to avert conflict between the Patent
Act and the Tariff Act,” 12 and after considering other sources of
legislative history, the Federal Circuit concluded that if § 271(g)
defenses were available in exclusion actions, patent holders would be
depredated of remedies guaranteed explicitly by the Process Patent
¶6

6

Certain Abrasive Products made Using a Process for Making Power Preforms,
and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-449, Initial Determination
(Feb. 8, 2002); Final Determination (Mar. 29, 2002).
7
362 F.3d at 1364-66 (finding that the Commission’s claim construction was
erroneous because the patentee (1) made it very clear that the invention was
limited to perform mixtures containing a larger volume of liquid binder than
matrix material and (2) included language in the patent specifications
disclaiming mixtures that do not contain a ratio of liquid binder to powder
higher than 1:1).
8
Id. at 1361 (“We conclude that on the correct claim construction the process of
the ‘489 patent was not practiced; the judgment of infringement is reversed.”).
9
Id.
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Amendments Act. Thus, the ITC and the Federal Circuit regrettably
endorsed a theory of § 271(g) applicability that encourages a bifurcated
approach to patent enforcement policy.
There are a number of reasons to think that this bifurcated policy
is inconsistent with a commitment to reading congressional history
sensibly. To see why Kinik’s dicta represent an affront to interpretive
fidelity, 13 consider the following. According to the Federal Circuit, the
key question in evaluating the Kinik Company’s claim that it could avail
itself of § 271(g) defenses is whether Congress clearly intended for these
defenses to apply in exclusion actions before the ITC. The Senate
Report for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (later
labeled the Process Patent Amendments Act) indicates that § 271(g) was
intended to provide “patent owners the new right to sue for damages and
seek an injunction in Federal district court when someone, without
authorization, uses or sells in the United States, or imports into the
United States a product made by their patented process.” 14 The language
in the Senate Report explicitly indicates where § 271(g) is intended to
apply, but does not include any language suggesting that this provision is
not meant to apply to actions before the ITC.
¶7

Unfortunately, the Senate Report does suggest that in adding §
271(g) to the Patent Act, Congress had “no intention to impose any of
these limitations on owners of products or on owners of process patents
in suits they are able to bring under existing law. Neither is there any
intention for these provisions to limit in any way the ability of process
patent owners to obtain relief from the U.S. International Trade
Commission.” 15 Before addressing the meaning that the Federal Circuit
gave to this dense passage in the Senate Report, it is useful to pause for a
moment to consider what is meant by the phrase “these limitations” in
the above excerpt. “These limitations” refers to the defenses in § 271(g),
because from the perspective of a U.S. patent holder, these defenses
make it less likely that a process patent will be enforced. After all, under
§ 271(g) a holder of a process patent will not prevail if a defendant
successfully shows that the imported product at issue is either produced
by a process that is “materially changed by subsequent processes” or has
become a “trivial and nonessential component of another product.” 16
This appears to be a rudimentary observation; but it is important to keep
¶8

13

See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165
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sense of the broad values that informed the creation of the necessarily-limited
rules embedded in those documents).
14
S. Rep. No. 100-83 at 27 (1987).
15
Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added).
16
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in mind that these defenses impose substantial practical limitations on
process patent holders’ rights.
The Federal Circuit interpreted Senate Report in the following
fashion. On the theory that Congress never meant § 271(g) to restrict,
hamper or restrain patent owners in actions before the ITC, which the
Kinik court took to follow necessarily from the Senate Report’s gloss on
§ 9006(c) that is emphasized above, the Federal Circuit read into the
Process Patent Amendments Act a critical limitation on § 271(g)’s
applicability.

¶9

¶10
This decision to read into the Act a limitation of § 271(g)’s
defenses in particular is very hard to justify for five reasons. First, as a
matter of statutory interpretation the Senate Report simply does not
compel or unequivocally support this reading. The key language cited in
Kinik merely says that Congress has no intention of limiting or
constraining patent holders’ ability to “obtain relief from the U.S.
International Trade Commission.” 17 The most natural reading of the
Senate Report is that Congress wanted to make it clear that existing
remedies, especially the ability to obtain exclusion orders from the ITC,
were not somehow undermined by the new set of defenses being made
available to defendants by § 271(g). Remedies, after all, refer to the type
of relief that a patent holder can secure—not to the legal standards that
govern the appropriateness of granting those remedies in a particular
case. Thus, § 9006(c)’s clear commitment to preserving the remedies
available in ITC proceedings is in no way inconsistent with applying the
substantive legal standards embodied in § 271(g) to exclusion actions
brought before the ITC. The Kinik court, in effect, made a category
mistake—confusing types of relief with substantive legal standards—in
suggesting that § 271(g) defenses do not apply to exclusion actions. 18

17

S. Rep. No. 100–83 at 60–61.
It is important to recognize that the Senate Report resists this interpretation.
To reiterate, the key language in the report indicates that in enacting § 271(g),
Congress did not intend to “limit in any way the ability of process patent owners
to obtain relief from the U.S. International Trade Commission.” Because the
operative verb is “to limit,” one must assume that Congress intended the
defenses in § 271(g) not to apply to exclusion actions before the ITC since
allowing these defenses to apply would constitute a clear limitation (of a very
particular kind) on the ability of process patent holders to obtain relief from the
ITC.
The most promising riposte to this complaint is that if Congress really had
intended to prevent § 271(g) from applying to exclusion actions, it would have
included in the official text of the Process Patents Amendment Act language
explicitly forbidding the ITC from applying § 271(g) defenses to exclusion
actions. Congress would have done this for one simple reason: to ensure that §
18
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Second, a strong argument can be made that Kinik unnecessarily
relied upon the legislative history of the Process Patent Amendments
Act. The proper use of legislative history is not achieved simply by
trying to give effect to every statement or claim made in the legislative
record. 19 To be sure, legislative history can be helpful in clarifying
difficult questions of congressional intent when a statute’s meaning is
deeply ambiguous. But in this case, there really was no need to rely on
the Senate Report because § 9006(c) was not—for reasons we have
already explored—deeply ambiguous.
Moreover, sensible jurists
understand the pitfalls of relying heavily upon statements in the
legislative record to determine controversial issues of law. Given the
administrative demands placed on members of the House and the Senate,
the reliance of those members on information received from numerous
staff members, and the sheer difficulty of arriving at reasonable
compromises on matters of public policy, 20 it is hardly surprising that
statements made in the legislative history might not provide the best lens
through which to view enacted statutes in particular cases. 21 Yet the
¶11

271(g), the only provision in the Patent Act that does not (under the theory
advocated by the Kinik court) apply in actions before the ITC, was not
mistakenly applied in exclusion actions by the ITC. Yet the Act itself merely
states that these “amendments . . . shall not deprive a patent holder of any
remedies available . . . under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.” Pub. L.
100–418, § 9006(c).
19
Blackstone’s admonition to avoid reading a statute literally if doing so will
produce an absurd result seems apt in the context of applying principles drawn
from legislative history to difficult questions of statutory interpretation: “Where
some collateral matter arises out of the general words [of a statute], and happens
to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this
consequence is not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty
to expound the statute by equity.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 90–91 (15th ed. 1809).
20
Justice Stephen Breyer, while sitting as Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, wrote a very interesting law review article in which
he argued that although legislative history can be a legitimate source of insight
into the purpose, scope, and applicability of a statute or a statutory provision, the
complexity of the lawmaking process itself should temper the weight a judge or
a court should give to statements in the legislative record. In addition, thenJudge Breyer argued that floor statements and other elements in the legislative
record are favored means of expressing congressional intent by members of the
House and the Senate because they assume that “[t]his language is more general
in form, and would not bind courts in cases where it would make no sense to do
so.” Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture: On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 860 (1992).
21
As Breyer aptly notes, “[n]o one claims that history is always useful; only that
it sometimes helps.” Id. at 862.
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Kinik court was blissfully unaware of this basic drawback of excessive
reliance on legislative history.
¶12
Third, with one exception, the Federal Circuit has never held that
a provision in the Patent Act does not apply to ITC proceedings. In
Nutrinova v. ITC, 22 the court added a footnote suggesting that 35 U.S.C.
§ 295, a provision dealing with burden shifting that was adopted as part
of the same statute in which § 271(g) was included, might not apply to
ITC proceedings since it states on its face that it applies to courts. The
key difference between § 295 and § 271(g) is that the former is
procedural in nature while the latter is substantive. In other words, the
Federal Circuit has never held that a substantive provision in the Patent
Statute does not apply to proceedings before the Commission.
¶13
Fourth, after the Process Patent Amendments Act was passed in
1988, the ITC consistently and openly recognized the general
applicability of § 271(g) defenses in exclusion actions. For example, in
1994 in In The Matter of Certain Recombinantly Produced Human
Growth Hormones, the ITC endorsed the administrative law judge’s
decision to apply § 271(g) defenses to an exclusion action. 23 By
consistently endorsing the application of these defenses, the accepted
practice of the ITC prior to Kinik paved the way for a stable, unified
approach to enforcing process patents abroad. This was, of course, the
main purpose behind adding § 271(g) to the Patent Statute in the first
place. 24
¶14
One might object that the accepted practice of the ITC prior to
Kinik is not particularly telling, since the only relevant issue is whether
the Commission’s rejection of § 271(g) defenses is legally legitimate.
The best legal response to this objection is that “[i]n deciding whether an
intellectual property right is infringed, the Commission applies the same
law and standards used in the district courts.” 25 This can only mean that
all equitable and legal defenses are available to defendants in exclusion

22

224 F.3d 1356, 1360 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Initial Determination, Inv. No. 337-TA-358, 1994 WL 930040 at p. 75-77,
Nov. 29, 1994.
24
As Timothy Holbrook has astutely observed, § 271(g) “closes a loophole in
the statute resulting from the territorial nature of the patent rights.” Timothy R.
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale:” Assessing Patent Infringement
for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability
Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 762
(2003).
25
William L. Lafuze & Patricia F. Stanford, An Overview of Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930: A Primer for Practice Before the International Trade
Commission, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459, 481 (1992).
23
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actions before the ITC. 26 As the Federal Circuit put this point in Texas
Instruments v. Tessera, “[i]n section 337 proceedings relevant to patent
infringement, the ITC follows Title 35 of the United States Code and the
case law of this court.” 27
¶15
In addition, Federal Circuit decisions have historically had—and
for a host of reasons should continue to have—claim and issue preclusive
effect on subsequent ITC proceedings. 28 Why is claim preclusion
relevant to the question of whether there should be a uniform approach to
process patent enforcement? As a pragmatic matter parties litigating
before the Federal Circuit cannot rest assured that their finality
interests—that is, the set of interests claim and issue preclusion are
designed to secure—are protected if a more plaintiff-friendly
enforcement standard is available in exclusion actions before the ITC. 29
As the Supreme Court has said, “[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an
end of litigation [and] that those who have contested an issue shall be
bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled as between the parties.” 30 Furthermore, as a
matter of theoretical jurisprudence the Federal Circuit’s commitment to
claim and issue preclusion fits better conceptually with a commitment to
a uniform process patent enforcement regime than such a commitment
fits with a bifurcated regime in which the ITC is free to exclude a range
of art that Federal Courts consider non-infringing. Although it may be
reasonable to offer process patent holders two distinct avenues of
redress—one in federal court and another before the International Trade

26

19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2000).
231 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
28
See Young Engineers, Inc. v. USITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“If a patent owner has unsuccessfully attacked an alleged infringer for the same
infringing acts in a prior court proceeding, no substantive argument has been
advanced as to why the patent owner should be given an opportunity to put forth
the same charge of infringement again. The alleged infringer is as burdened by
the litigation before the Commission as before a court. Moreover, if a second
court proceeding would be precluded, there seems no reason that the
Commission must devote time and attention to that matter.”).
29
There are two critical differences between litigating in federal court and
litigating before the ITC that heighten (rather than diminish) the importance of
finality for defendants in process patent cases. First, the evidentiary procedures
adopted by the ITC are more lax than those allowed in federal court; and second,
there are statutory restrictions on the amount of time that the ITC may devote to
a particular investigation. See 19 USC § 1337(b)(1) (requiring the ITC to make
a determination “at the earliest practicable time”).
30
Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
27
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Commission—the adoption of significantly different legal standards in
these fora is not defensible. 31
¶16
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, in light of the fact that the
Process Patent Amendments Act expanded the rights of patent owners,
conditioning the exercise of these new rights simply cannot “deprive a
patent owner of any remedies available” under pre-Act law. 32 The Act
affords a patent holder a right to prevent a foreign manufacturer from
using a “patented process outside the United States to make products and
then import and sell the products in the United States without incurring
infringement liability.” 33 As a technical legal matter, this right is limited
by § 271(g)’s defenses in the following way: (1) the new right a patent
holder enjoys under the Act to prevent foreign manufacturers from
unauthorized use of process patents abroad must be exercised with §
271(g)’s limitations, and (2) any limitations built into this right do not
abridge or dilute this right. 34 Call this the “new right” argument.
¶17
This “new right” argument makes it clear that if Congress crafts
a right with certain boundaries, certain conditions on the exercise of that
right, it is nonsensical to complain that the right conferred “deprives”
patent holders of remedies available under preexisting (but different)
law. To be sure, it is possible, strictly speaking, that Congress intended
to create a right that could be exercised in any venue but also intended
the limitations on that right to be venue-specific. In light of the
ambiguity in the Senate Report, the importance of promoting a uniform
policy for process patent enforcement, and the force of the “new right”

31

One could reasonably argue that this observation cuts in the other direction as
well. The idea is that fostering a truly unified, stable system of process patent
enforcement abroad also requires giving ITC findings and decisions claim and
issue preclusive effect in federal courts. This proposal has some surface
plausibility, although it does certainly ignore the fact that Markman hearings are
not widely utilized in exclusion actions before the ITC. In addition, by virtue of
having in rem jurisdiction over all imported products, some ITC exclusion
orders would be moot in federal court (in light of the fact that patent plaintiffs in
federal court have to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants). In an
interesting student note, Douglas Martin argues that if issue preclusive effect is
given only to the ITC’s factual findings, then the Federal Circuit’s de novo
review privileges for matters of law will increase the degree of uniformity in
patent law enforcement. Douglas P. Martin, Comment, Preclusive Effect of
Factual Determinations of the International Trade Commission With Regard to
Patent Matters, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 885, 914–15 (1995).
32
Pub. L. 100–418, § 9006(c).
33
Anna M. Budde, Note, Liability of a Foreign Manufacturer Using a Patented
Process for Indirect Infringement, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 291, 294 (1995).
34
I am indebted to Professor Mark Lemley for suggesting this argument.
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argument in evaluating § 9006(c) of the Act, it is clear that § 271(g) was
not meant as a venue-specific provision.

II. EXCESSIVE DISCRETION
¶18
In describing the Kinik court’s reasoning with respect to why the
ITC’s rejection of § 271 was acceptable, we left out an important detail
concerning the nature of the deference accorded to the ITC’s prior
handling of the Kinik Company’s claims. By way of review, in the
original action before the ITC, the Kinik Company claimed that §
271(g)’s defenses applied. The ITC rejected this argument, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC after consulting two statutes and one
document from the Act’s legislative history:

•

Section 9006(c) of the Act: These “amendments . . .
shall not deprive a patent holder of any remedies
available . . . under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930” 35 ;

•

The language in § 271(g): “A product which is
made by a patented process will, for the purposes of
this title, not be considered to so made after—(1) it
is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component
of another product” 36 ; and

•

The Senate Report’s language:
There is no
“intention for these provisions to limit in any way
the ability of process patent owners to obtain relief
from the U.S. International Trade Commission.” 37

According to Kinik, under the Chevron doctrine 38 “[t]o the extent that
there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the interpretation of § 337(a) and
its successor § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii), deference must be given to the view of
the agency that is charged with its administration.” 39 The Federal Circuit
emphasized the possibility that the relevant statutes were riddled with
“uncertainty” or “ambiguity” in large part because the Chevron doctrine
imposes a duty upon courts to defer to “reasonable agency interpretations
not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative authority to an

35

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
37
S. Rep. No. 100-83 at 27 (1987).
38
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
39
362 F.3d at 1363.
36
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agency, but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute
that an agency is charged with administering.” 40
¶19
Although some argue that the Chevron doctrine can undermine
courts’ ability to exercise a reasonable amount of discretion in deciding
when to defer to agency decisions, 41 the principal problem with Kinik’s
invocation of the Chevron doctrine is not jurisprudential in nature. The
main problem is that the ITC is not the agency charged with interpreting
the Patent Act. Thus, on a defensible interpretation of the Chevron
doctrine, the particular interpretive choices the ITC made in this instance
do not deserve any deference. 42
¶20
Even if one were to argue that the Commission is eligible for
Chevron’s protection because it was “forced” to make a decision about a
legal issue at the intersection of § 1337 (a statute that it is charged with
administering) and § 271(g), Chevron clearly does not apply. Because
the Commission read a substantive limitation into a statute it was not
charged with administering, the Chevron doctrine is inapplicable.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of the scope of
the Chevron doctrine supports this argument unequivocally: The
Chevron doctrine is predicated upon the “presumption that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts)
to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” 43

40

Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 833 (2001).
41
See id. (“Chevron’s equation of gaps and ambiguities with express delegations
turned the doctrine of mandatory deference, formerly an isolated pocket of
administrative law doctrine, into a ubiquitous formula governing court-agency
relations. With this one small doctrinal shift, the Court effected a fundamental
transformation in the relationship between courts and agencies under
administrative law.”) (emphasis added).
42
The fact that the ITC is not charged with interpreting the Patent Act has an
additional implication. In paragraphs thirteen and fourteen, a number of ITC
cases were cited as support for the claim that prior to Kinik, the ITC openly
recognized the general applicability of § 271(g) defenses in exclusion actions. It
is important to realize that the fact the ITC’s pre-Kinik record of adjudication
reflected a better understanding of § 271(g)’s applicability does not in any way
imply that the ITC deserves deference under the Chevron doctrine. Thus,
claiming that prior to Kinik the ITC employed a superior understanding of §
271(g)’s defenses does not intimate that there is a principled reason under
Chevron to grant deference to the ITC’s practices. Put another way, recognizing
the legal coherence of pre-Kinik decisions is not to be confused with claiming
that the ITC generally deserves deference under the Chevron doctrine.
43
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 9

Not only does the Court make clear that Chevron deference
requires that the agency requesting deference be the same agency
charged with administering a given statute, the Court also makes plain
that where ambiguity is “built in” to a statute, the agency that administers
that statute has a responsibility not to abuse the degree of discretion the
ambiguity allows. In other words, even if one conceded arguendo that
Chevron applies to the question in Kinik, a very compelling argument
could be made that the ITC abused its discretion by reading a substantive
limitation into a statutory provision that the Commission was clearly not
charged with administering. In that connection, one could also argue that
the Federal Circuit, in virtue of being charged with hearing appeals from
all actions arising under Title 35 and from all ITC actions in § 1337
matters, is in the best position to decide what types of limitations §
271(g) should have. The Federal Circuit should decide this issue de
novo and not abdicate its responsibility on this important issue.
¶21

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF KINIK FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE
¶22
The main theme that runs through Parts I and II of this iBrief is
that the Kinik dicta threaten to create two different regimes for process
patent protection—one that strikes a reasonable balance between the
interests of patent holders and follow-on innovators and another that may
be unjustifiably pro-plaintiff. The first regime is governed by § 271(g);
the second, as we have just seen, is governed by the unfettered discretion
of the ITC.
¶23
What is wrong with having two very different regimes? One
could argue that Kinik chafes against the interests of U.S. consumers,
consumers who would benefit from having access to less expensive
goods, including everything from medicines to automobile parts.
Framed in the idiom of antitrust law, Kinik provides U.S. patents holders
an additional method of preventing competition from foreign
manufacturers. There is, fortunately, an exception in § 1337(d)(1) that
allows the ITC to refuse to issue an exclusion order on public health and
welfare grounds. Even so, a more effective means of reducing the
likelihood that ITC exclusion actions will lend the color of law to
otherwise unlawful, anticompetitive purposes would be to recognize the
applicability of § 271(g) to exclusion actions.
¶24
Kinik also has implications for international relations. Since
Kinik stands for the idea that the ITC can lawfully make it significantly
harder for a defendant to establish a defense based on noninfringement in
an exclusion dispute, the foreign business community is likely to view
this as an instance of protectionism. After all, the ITC is a body that can
unilaterally exclude foreign products from importation into the United
States, a fact that will inevitably color foreign perception of the fairness
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of its procedures. More specifically, foreign business interests are likely
to find unfair (and perhaps hypocritical) Kinik’s refusal to extend §
271(g)’s defenses—defenses that all defendants have in U.S. federal
courts—to exclusion actions given the aggregate effect of exclusion
orders on the balance of trade in intellectual property. Foreign
businesses are likely to find this policy unfair (and perhaps hypocritical)
precisely because the United States has used the TRIPS Agreement 44 to
aggressively prosecute violations of its intellectual property rights all
over the world. 45 One commentator even calls the U.S. “the most
strident enforcer of TRIPS.” 46 Thus, from the perspective of foreign
business this development in patent policy casts the U.S. in a bad light,
essentially as a country readily willing to embrace a predatory and selfserving attitude toward international trade where international
cooperation in this area would be better served by an attitude of fairness
and a genuine commitment to providing reciprocal treatment.
¶25
There is another way, a slightly more formalistic way, of
thinking about why Kinik’s dicta promote protectionism. Under Article
27 of TRIPS, “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.” 47 If
the ITC were to exclude products made abroad that federal courts would
not find infringing (for they would apply § 271(g)), then a discrimination
claim with respect to the place of invention would actually be hard to
make under TRIPS. After all, unless the defendant raises validity
counterclaims, then the “place of invention” is by definition the
jurisdiction in which the United States patent holder invented the process
patent at issue. Yet it would be possible to raise a discrimination claim

44

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
45
The United States files “more TRIPS complaints than all other WTO countries
combined.” Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds:
The United States, Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 160, 173 (2005).
46
Id.
47
TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 27.1. A note of clarification is necessary. The
principal aim of Article 27 is to ensure that favorable discrimination is not
granted to local pantentees over foreign patent holders. In other words, this
article was designed to ensure that foreign patent holders received the same
degree of protection as local patent holders. But Article 27 also prohibits
discrimination on the basis of whether “products are imported or produced
locally.” Kevin J. Nowak, Note, Staying Within the Negotiated Framework:
Abiding by the Non-Discrimination Clause in Trips Article 27, 26 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 899, 911 (2005).
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with respect to whether products are imported or locally produced, for
the simple reason that the ITC provides a special remedy for domestic
patent holders who believe that their process patents have been used
without authorization by foreign manufacturers. 48
¶26
It is uncertain that such a claim would be successful before the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), but the thrust of the claim is that a
domestic patent policy that prevents access to a domestic market
constitutes discrimination “as to the availability and enjoyability of
patents due to the place of invention.” 49 Given that one of TRIPS’s
primary objectives is to eliminate national working requirements that
would otherwise compel a patentee to manufacture a patented product or
apply a patented process within the patent granting country, this claim
might appear dubious. 50 Article 27 certainly does not explicitly mention
the rights of accused infringers. Yet the underling legal theory is a
familiar one under TRIPS: alleged foreign infringers are treated unfairly
under Article 27 if they are treated differently than similarly situated
domestic infringers. The WTO Appellate Body would be hard pressed to
conclude that the form of “discrimination” is in principle verboten by
Article 27, for this would completely invalidate the Process Patent
Amendments Act. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body could conclude that
where (1) a certain set of limitations (§ 271(g) defenses) to a domestic
patent right are not applied in a venue that regulates what can be
imported into the United States, (2) causing the deliberate exclusion of
foreign products that would not be considered infringing art in U.S.
federal courts, Article 27 is violated.

48

In fact, when the Process Patent Amendments Act was being considered in the
Senate, Commissioner Quigg expressly endorsed maintaining the availability of
exclusion actions because he felt that they provided a very different kind of
protection for domestic patent holders than did ordinary litigation in federal
courts. He stated: “I think it is important to keep 337, because it [exclusion
actions provide] a short-term compact operation which the patent owner can
use to prevent the market from slipping away to foreign manufacturers. Patent
litigation in the Federal courts is a more prolonged thing. It is not likely that
you would be able to get a preliminary injunction during the litigation, and
therefore the 337 approach does have a benefit for U.S. patent holders”
(emphasis added). Process Patents, Hearings on S. 1543 before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 12.
49
Nowak, supra note 47, at 919.
50
See generally Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working
Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 243 (1997).

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 9

In addition, Kinik also appears to be inconsistent with the
language and purpose of Article 34 of TRIPS. 51 Article 34.1, in relevant
part, states that “[f]or the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the
infringement of the rights of the [patent holder] . . . the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that
the process to obtain an identical produce is different from the patented
process.” 52 To ensure that judicial authorities have this power, TRIPS
requires that in circumstances where the “patented process is new” or
whenever there is a “substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by [patented] process” at issue, “Members shall provide . . . that
any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent
owner shall, in absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been
[produced] by the patented process.” 53
¶27

¶28
This sounds very complicated, but the main thrust of Article 34.1
is straightforward. The idea is that because disputes over patented
processes are likely to involve difficult evidentiary issues, each signatory
of the TRIPS Agreement should take steps to ensure that a patent holder
is not short-changed because she is unable to (strictly) prove that the
process used for manufacturing purposes on foreign soil is identical to
the process she patented. The most obvious strategy for doing so is to
place the burden on the defendant. But since the drafters of Article 34.1
could not have intended this burden-shifting provision to be interpreted
as an irrefutable presumption, they included a critical caveat: it is only
“in the absence of proof to the contrary” that a presumption of process
patent infringement can hold up.

Therein lies the rub with Kinik: If Article 34.1 of TRIPS
requires signatories to allow defendants to rebut any presumption of
process patent infringement, then the United States has a commitment to
allow defendants before federal courts and the ITC to provide evidence
that controverts the presumption of infringement. Notice, however, that
it is not clear that defendants must be able to offer every conceivable
type of evidence to challenge a plaintiff’s assertions of infringement.
Thus, Kinik appears to be inconsistent with Article 34.1 only if that
provision’s requirement is interpreted so broadly that defendants must be
able to present any and all conceivable defenses. Suffice it to say that
this seems a bit of a stretch, since Article 34.1 is clearly concerned with
establishing procedural standards for handling factual defenses in process
patent infringement cases. That the drafters of the Agreement were
obviously far less concerned with equitable defenses than they were with
factual defenses is obvious from the language in 34.1(b): “if there is a
¶29

51

TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 34.1.
Id.
53
Id. (emphasis added).
52
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substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process
and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used,” then “Members shall provide that
any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent
owner shall, in absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been
[produced] by the patented process.” 54
¶30
Speculating on how often claims based on Article 27.1 or 34.1
would be successful is beyond the scope of this iBrief. However, it is
clear that the selective application of defenses like those embodied in §
271(g) to process patent infringement raises serious concerns for nations
that are committed to complying with the letter and the spirit of TRIPS.
Certainly, given the economic returns that TRIPS provides the United
States, it would be wise for Congress to take steps to nullify the Federal
Circuit’s unfortunate misstep in Kinik.

CONCLUSION
¶31
The dicta in Kinik are dangerous because they suggest that the
policies underlying the enforcement of domestic patent law against
foreign infringers can be cast aside at the whim of the Federal Circuit.
This is extremely problematic. The purpose of the Process Patents
Amendment Act of 1988 is to balance two competing policy objectives.
On the one hand, the Act was meant to provide a form of legal redress
for domestic patent holders whose process patents were being infringed
on foreign soil (in addition to the exclusion actions already available
under existing trade law). But the Act surely should be read as having
the purpose of preventing domestic patent holders from misusing their
patents by illegitimately obtaining exclusion orders from the
International Trade Commission, even if one thinks that the “for the
purposes of this title” language in § 271(g) renders the scope of this
provision’s applicability unclear. Under § 271(g) of the Act, an
exclusion order is illegitimate if the product produced by the patented
process has been significantly changed by subsequent processes or if the
product has become a trivial and nonessential component of another
product.

Unfortunately, Kinik has given future courts an incentive to
ignore the clear policy objectives of the Process Patents Amendment Act
of 1988. These policy objectives are crucial to striking a fair balance
between effective process patent protection, on the one hand, and
recognizing the right of foreign industry to aggressively innovate, on the
other. Not only did Kinik provide no persuasive policy justifications for
setting § 271(g) aside, the most compelling policy justifications for
¶32

54

Id.
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leaving this crucial provision intact appear to have been deliberately
ignored. We can only hope that Congress will soon step in 55 to ensure
that the fragmented enforcement regime Kinik endorses is dismantled
sooner rather than later.

55

The Patent Law Committee is considering supporting a bill that would strike
the language “for the purposes of this title” from 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) in the hopes
that doing so would make it obvious to the International Trade Commission that
§ 271(g)’s defenses do indeed apply to exclusion actions. This modification of §
271(g) would certainly render moot the (already-implausible) Chevron argument
that the ITC relied upon, since there would be no need for the ITC to interpret
the scope of this provision in the Patent Statute. However, the ITC did not
exclusively rely upon the aforementioned language in § 271(g); it also relied
upon § 9006(c) and opaque language in the Senate Report.
What this suggests is that if § 271(g) is amended as outlined above, the Federal
Circuit could (1) review the ITC’s interpretation of the statute and the legislative
history de novo and (2) conclude, contrary to Congress’ intent in these
circumstances, that § 271(g) applies in a case-by-case basis. The reason this
admittedly unlikely scenario is still worth taking seriously is that the Federal
Circuit found plausible the Commission’s reliance on § 9006(c) and the Senate
Report, which strongly suggests that when it affirmed the Commission’s
determination, the Federal Circuit had more in mind than the six words that the
Patent Law Committee wants to strike from the current version of § 271(g). See
Amendment to 271(g), http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/patent_legislation/
(Oct. 14, 2005) (“Now, there is a movement afoot to change this aspect of the
law, striking words that limit those defense to actions under the Patent Act so
that they could be applied with equal force at the ITC.”).

